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Abstract
The Cold War may be over but the force modernization war has just begun. If the
Air Force is going to meet its goals established in Joint Vision 2001, ways must be found
to modernize aging weapon systems in the face of decreasing defense budgets and
personnel resources. In a hurried effort to realize the savings necessary to continue with
modernization, Air Force leaders have embraced the philosophy of outsourcing.
Proponents claimed that outsourcing would reap vast savings, but recent General
Accounting Office (GAO) audits confirm that the savings from outsourcing have not
been as high as originally projected. These recent GAO reports suggest that problems
with the way that cost estimating is done for outsourcing competition studies may
overstate the economic advantages of this alternative to organic support (GAO Report,
GAO/NSIAD-97-86,1997).
The question Air Force leaders want to know is; can we determine whether or not
outsourcing is a better value than maintaining a capability in-house? A unique situation
has arisen at the Sacramento Air Logistics Center (ALC) where control of depot-level
maintenance for the F-l 17 was transferred from government to contractor control. Now
that control of the depot-level maintenance of the F-l 17 has been outsourced, we wanted
to find out if outsourcing was a better value than the previous government controlled
support. This study used archival cost data and mission capability factors, top level
management interviews, and a customer satisfaction questionnaire to examine the relative
value of outsourcing depot support of the F-l 17. Triangulating these three value
elements helped us determine if outsourcing cost less, improved readiness, and increased

customer satisfaction when compared to government controlled depot-level maintenance.
Our analysis found that depot maintenance of the F-l 17 since transferred to contractor
control is a better value to the Air Force. Technical performance has been equal or better
and savings of approximately $25 million is projected for the first year.

BEFORE AND AFTER: IS OUTSOURCING A BETTER VALUE THAN
ORGANIC SUPPORT?
A CASE STUDY COMPARING ORGANIC VS. CONTRACTOR CONTROLLED
DEPOT-LEVEL MAINTENANCE OF THE F-117

I. Introduction
Background
With the end of the Cold War, the role of the Department of Defense (DoD) has
radically changed. Since we are no longer challenged by another superpower and the
main threat to the United States comes in the form of regional conflicts, the role and
mission of the American military are less clear. As a result, support for large defense
budgets has waned. Since the mid-1980s there has been an almost continuous reduction
in defense spending. We have witnessed the withdrawal of troops from overseas,
reductions in civilian and military personnel, base closures, and reductions of major
weapon system acquisitions.
In 1993, Vice President Gore announced the National Performance Review (NPR)
along with his plan for the reinvention of Government. With NPR, came an increased
emphasis on improving fundamental internal processes. In its most basic form, NPR
builds on four key principles: (1) cutting red tape; (2) putting customers first;
(3) empowering employees to get results; and (4) cutting back to basics: producing better
government for less. One strategy being explored to achieve NPR's efficiency goals is to
encourage federal organizations to explore the viability of having private companies

perform all non-inherently governmental work. As the largest spender of discretionary
funds, the DoD is one federal agency that can't afford to do things in its usual way,
especially when private firms may be able to perform DoD's non-core functions better,
cheaper, and faster. "Functions such as command, deployment, or rotation of troops
cannot be contracted, of course. But data processing, billing, payroll, and the like
certainly can" (Gore, 1993: 58). The following quote summarizes the overall philosophy
oftheNPR:
We can no longer afford to pay more - and get less from - our
government. The answer for every problem cannot always be another
program or more money. It is time to radically change the way the
government operates - to shift from top-down bureaucracy to
entrepreneurial government that empowers citizens and communities
to change the country from the bottom up. We must reward the people
and ideas that work and get rid of those that don't. (Gore, 1993: 58)
A dwindling Air Force budget, increased operations tempo, and continuing
manpower reductions have presented Air Force leaders with retention problems and the
challenge of doing more with only 62 percent of the budget and 65 percent of the
manpower often years ago. In 1989 the Air Force manpower level was 570,880 with a
budget of $121 billion. In 1998 manpower was reduced to 371,577 and available funding
dropped to $76 billion ("The Air Force in Facts and Figures", Air Force Magazine, Vol.
48,1998: 36 & 46). Air Force leaders began eliminating unnecessary infrastructure
(closing bases), and recouping the associated infrastructure costs. Opponents of these
closures created a debate in Congress that resulted in reduced effectiveness of the Air
Force's primary means of saving money. Political lines were drawn, and Congressmen
fought to see who would control what some would call "government job welfare"
(Kitfield, 1998: 28-31). The battles and long standing debate resulted because the

management plan to quickly close McClellan Air Force Base was not implemented
decisively. This resulted in a compromise to privatize in-place the work of the
Sacramento ALC (Kitfield, 1998: 28-31).
In spite of these difficulties, the Air Force has stepped up its pursuit of
outsourcing any function that is not an inherently governmental function: "Additional
outsourcing studies involving more than 100,000 positions will be started over the next
six years" (GAO Report, GAO/NSIAD-97-86,2-7,1997). The primary areas considered
for outsourcing were base support functions and depot-level maintenance. Initially,
proponents claimed that outsourcing could save the Department of Defense billions of
dollars. However, several recent General Accounting Office (GAO) reports regarding
cost estimating practices and other commercial sector warning flags have caused us to reevaluate the projected savings generated from outsourcing. This is a key factor in Future
Years Defense Budgets because current Air Force weapons programs have used these
projected savings in their program budget estimates (Peters, 1999: 21). The question now
is: Is outsourcing a better value than organic support^ This question demonstrates the
need to do more research on the costs and benefits of outsourcing before proceeding
further.
In her thesis entitled "Outsourcing: An Historical Review For The Projection Of
Future Savings," Captain Leslee J. Saleck reviews both historical and current trends in
outsourcing along with the conditions that contribute to a successful outsourcing
relationship with the contractor. She warns that, "The DoD should be cautious about
wholeheartedly embracing the Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) and Defense
Science Boards (DSB) recommendations to outsource essentially every non-war-fighting

activity. Though there is potential for savings through outsourcing, it is highly dependent
on the existence of multiple conditions (Saleck, 1998: 74)." The conditions that represent
the most feasible environment for outsourcing are: (1) the work to be done is clearly
specified; (2) several potential producers are available, and a competitive climate either
exists or can be created and sustained; (3) the government is able to monitor the
contractor's performance; and (4) appropriate terms are included in the contract
document and enforced (Savas, 1987: 109). This research examines the differences in
cost and performance of government controlled depot level maintenance and contractor
controlled depot level maintenance, and suggests a method of measuring the value gained
or lost from outsourcing.

Problem Statement
The primary goal of this research was to examine, through triangulation of
archival cost and performance data, expert interviews, and a customer satisfaction
questionnaire, whether or not the Air Force was receiving a better value by outsourcing
total responsibility for the depot-level maintenance of the F-l 17. Part of this primary
goal is to design a questionnaire that measures the customer's perception of the value
received from outsourced depot-level maintenance of the F-l 17. Throughout this
research the value determination measured is the comparison of government controlled
depot-level maintenance versus contractor controlled depot-level maintenance. The
results of this study are representative of the F-l 17 only and do not reflect the value of
outsourcing to the Air Force as a whole. A secondary goal was to develop research
procedures that may be used in future multiple case studies. These procedures attempt to

highlight the cost and performance of organic support compared to the cost and
performance of outsourcing in an effort to provide a method of quantifying the overall
value attained from outsourcing. It is our hope that this triangulated comparative method
can be used to evaluate whether or not the Air Force is receiving a better overall value
from outsourcing.
Criticisms of government estimating practices during outsourcing competitions
arose from industry and initiated an effort to equalize estimating practices. Recently, the
GAO published similar criticisms and has confirmed that the savings derived from
outsourcing are not as great as originally projected (GAO Report, GAO/NSIAD-98-48,
1997). A recent decision to outsource the responsibility for depot level maintenance of
the F-l 17 aircraft has made it possible to study a weapon system that transitioned from
government control of sustainment functions to complete contractor control. By
gathering actual cost and performance data and comparing it to the customer satisfaction
questionnaire, we were able to determine if the data collected reflected the opinions of
the customers. Further, by triangulating the cost and performance data and the opinion
surveys we hoped to gain some insights into how best to shape value measures in order to
promote best value decision-making in these critical support areas.
Investigative Questions
The investigative questions are designed to focus the research on an examination
of contractor performance data, cost benefits, and perceived customer satisfaction.
1. Are the contract performance metrics good indicators of better value!
2. Has the decision to outsource F-l 17 depot-level maintenance provided a better value
to the Air Force?

3. If outsourcing F-117 depot maintenance is an equal or better value, do we still want to
give up the potential core capability?
Research Focus
The factors studied here are the differences in cost and performance resulting
from the experience of having both organic and contractor controlled depot-level
maintenance. The goal is to assess F-117 outsourcing to determine if it is a better value
to the Air Force than organic support. The plan is to measure the actual differences in
performance factors and then to triangulate the archival and secondary data, expert
interviews, and customer satisfaction questionnaire results to increase the internal and
external validity of this single case study (Yin, 1989). The focus then is to gather
pertinent cost and other associated value factors through archival data analysis and
compare them with the level of customer perceived value gathered from the customer
satisfaction questionnaires. Once the data are analyzed, and shown to be either valid or
invalid measures of the value of outsourcing, the researchers will make recommendations
for further use of this information.

Assumptions
If the results of the archival data analysis and customer satisfaction questionnaires
are consistent with our proposition that outsourcing is a better value than organic
maintenance, it means that the decision to outsource was appropriate for the F-l 17
aircraft. The results we obtain are reliable only for this depot and this particular situation.
If the results are not consistent with our proposition, or if the results of the questionnaire
conflict with the archival data analysis, additional research may be required. A finding

inconsistent with our proposition would suggest that future decisions to outsource
additional key government functions should be thoroughly researched. The most
important aspect of this research is to determine if outsourcing the F-l 17 provided the
best overall value to the government and to build a framework for future decision-makers
to apply when confronted with a similar outsourcing decision.

Limitations
This study does not analyze the political or social confounds impacting decisions
to outsource. Several comments have already been made about the inaccuracy of the
methodology used to estimate costs during outsourcing competitions. The General
Accounting Office (GAO) and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) are
currently researching how government costs are estimated for outsourcing competitions
in an effort to solve the problem (GAO Report, GAO/NSIAD-97-86,1997). Because
these two agencies are pursuing a solution to the estimating problem, this research does
not address that area. The researchers acknowledge that there are many difficulties with
current cost estimation practices, and that their solution is beyond the scope of this
research.
The outsourcing of the depot-level maintenance of the F-l 17 is a unique situation.
There was no competition between the private and public sector because the base was
authorized for closure; and although there was a most efficient organization cost
estimated completed, it was not used as a baseline for cost comparison purposes because
of a lack of confidence in its accuracy.

Definitions
Key terms and definitions necessary to understand the major aspects of this
research are briefly summarized below. Complete definitions of these terms are found in
Appendix A.
Outsourcing - is the use of federal funds to pay a private company to do defense
work or provide a service for a defense activity (GAO Report, GAO/NSAID-97-86,
1997: 2).
Privatization - the complete transfer of ownership and management of a function
to the private sector, but DOD pays for the services associated with the function (GAO
Report, GAO/NSAID-97-86,1997: 2).
Better Value - a construct, in this framework, that is measured by whether or not
there are actual improvements in cost, mission capable ratings (MCR's), quality,
timeliness, and reliability of depot repairs.
Modernization - a key goal of the Air Force leadership, outlined in Joint Vision
2001, to replace or upgrade the aging Air Force weapon systems (Defense Issues, 1996:
1&2).
Inherently Governmental Function - "a function that is so intimately related to the
public interest as to mandate performance by Government employees" (GAO Report,
GAO/NSAID-97-86,1997: 2).
Total Non Mission Capable Supply Rate - (TNMCS) is based upon the percentage
of aircraft not mission capable due to supply. It is calculated monthly to establish a 12month moving average (F-117 TSPR Performance Metrics, 1998).

MICAP Delivery - MICAP response time will be calculated monthly to establish a
twelve month moving average. This metric is based upon the time taken by LMSW to
deliver parts necessary to perform the mission to HAFB (F-117 TSPR Performance
Metrics, 1998).
RSP Kit Fill Rate - RSP Kit Fill Rates will be calculated monthly to establish a
12-month moving average. This metric is based upon the total number of pieces on hand
in both A and B kits divided by the total number of pieces authorized (F-117 TSPR
Performance Metrics, 1998).
Depot Quality - is calculated by individual aircraft using a weighted point system
that is based upon the number of major and minor discrepancies found after the
contractor has requested DCMC sign-off for closure (F-117 TSPR Performance Metrics,
1998).
Depot Delivery - The depot delivery metric is calculated for each aircraft and is
based upon the total number of days each aircraft fails to deliver on time (F-117 TSPR
Performance Metrics, 1998).
Delinquent Efficiency Reports (DRs) - Delinquency tracking is performed
monthly to establish a 12-month moving average. This metric is based on the average
number of delinquent DRs (F-l 17 TSPR Performance Metrics, 1998).

Chapter Summary
Although outsourcing has been practiced for many years, the Air Force's loss of
base closures as its primary means of saving force modernization dollars increased the
emphasis on the use of outsourcing. Originally, proponents claimed that millions of

dollars could be saved by outsourcing; however, recent GAO audits suggest the savings
are less than proposed (GAO Report, GAO/GGD 90-58,1990). Air Force leaders are
now asking researchers if they can measure whether outsourcing is a better value than
maintaining a capability in-house. This thesis uses the triangulation of archival cost and
performance data, expert interviews with those involved in the decision to outsource, and
a customer satisfaction questionnaire to determine the value of outsourcing the depotlevel maintenance of the F-l 17 to the DoD.
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II. The Progression of Outsourcing
Chapter Overview
This chapter briefly discusses the history of outsourcing within private industry
and the Department of Defense, and then highlights some of the most recent outsourcing
developments. The chapter continues with a review of make or buy decisions. Then it
discusses the reasons why outsourcing has become the chosen method of cost savings.
Next, it looks at regulatory and policy guidance. Then it examines some of the recent
problems and developments in how the Air Force plans to use outsourcing to save the
money needed to modernize its force, and methods for determining its value. Finally, it
addresses the decision to place F-117 depot-level maintenance under the direct control of
the contractor.

History of Outsourcing
The move towards outsourcing is not a recent phenomena. For over 40 years the
government has looked for ways to optimize its budgets.
Since 1955, federal agencies have been encouraged to obtain goods
and services from the private sector through outsourcing. In 1966, the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued circular A-76, which
established the federal policy for the government's performance of
commercial activities. In a 1983 supplemental handbook, OMB
established procedures for determining whether commercial activities
should be outsourced. (GAO Report, GAO/NSIAD 97-86,15,1997)
The end of the Cold War brought sweeping changes throughout the
Department of Defense including decreasing budgets, manpower, and resources. To deal
with these changes "the Department of Defense must meet three major challenges defined
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in Joint Vision 2001: readiness, quality of life, and weapons modernization" (Armed
Forces Information Service: 2,1996). Sound business judgement must be employed
when evaluating the risks involved in making the determination to outsource.

To Make or Not to Make
In his article "A Guide to Logistics Outsourcing," author Robert Bowman
discusses the issues of outsourcing and warns:
Outsourcing isn't for everyone. It isn't for those for whom logistics
is a core competency or one that is essential to winning and retaining
customers. Companies looking to make that initial determination must
ask themselves a series of key questions: (1) What are my current strategic
objectives regarding services and costs; (2) Which activities should be
"owned," and which should be outsourced; and (3) Should "owned"
resources be reconfigured? If so how? (Bowman, 1997: 34-36)
The basic reasons for deciding whether to make or buy should not be based on
cost alone. Many factors need to be considered. "You concentrate on your core
competencies, and outsource what other companies can do better than you" (Lear-Olimpi,
1997: 40). "Outsourcing is often thought of as a cost-cutting tactic, but it may cost the
same as doing things yourself; the savings may be in cutting cycle or delivery times,
moving products faster or primarily in not doing something wrong" (Lear-Olimpi, 1997:
42). "Companies often make parts out of a sense of corporate responsibility - namely a
desire to preserve jobs" (Venkatesan, 1992: 100). This type of thinking can quickly put a
company in financial trouble. DoD is not unlike private industry when it comes to
making a decision whether to make or buy a needed resource. Resources are limited
within both industry and DoD and these limited resources must be judiciously expended.
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The DoD must ensure that decisions regarding outsourcing are made based on sound
business practices.
Companies report that outsourcing enables them to focus on their core
competencies; improve service quality, responsiveness, and agility; obtain access to new
technologies; and employ more efficient business practices. Competitive forces have
encouraged the creation of entire new industries to meet the demand for specialized
services. "In 1996, these service industries will generate an estimated $100 billion in
sales" (Armed Forces Information Service, 1996:2). Surveys performed by a range of
organizations all document the trend toward more outsourcing.
Some examples include: (1) A 1994 study by Pitney Bowes
Management Services found that 77 percent of 100 Fortune 500
firms surveyed outsourced some aspect of their business support
services; (2) A 1992 study of 1200 companies conducted by the
Outsourcing Institute found that 50 percent of firms with information
technology budgets over $5 million are either outsourcing or actively
considering it; (3) A 1994 study conducted by KPMG-Peat Marwick
of 309 Fortune 1000 companies found that 48 percent outsourced
warehousing functions: and (4) A 1994 study conducted by the
Olsten Corp. of 400 firms found that 45 percent outsourced payroll
management functions. (Armed Forces Information Service, 1996: 7)
Studies suggest that many local governments, including those of Chicago, Indianapolis,
Los Angeles, Philadelphia, and San Francisco, have used outsourcing as a way to lower
costs and improve customer service.
The myriad of ways to outsource makes defining privatization, the government
version of make or buy, difficult. In its purest form, the term refers to the shifting of the
production of a good or the provision of a service from the government to the private
sector, often by selling government owned assets. According to Elaine Kamarck, who
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heads Vice President Gore's National Performance Review, "Outsourcing means purely
divesting the government function" (Shoop, 1995: 17). Most definitions of privatization
are more expansive, including any action that involves exposing the operations of
government to the commercial market. It is often difficult to tell where government ends
and the private sector begins. The following definitions are provided in an article by
Tom Shoop entitled Going. Going. Gone:
-Selling Out- Sales of federal assets. Example: Naval petroleum Reserves.
-Service Shutdown - The government discontinues or gives up responsibility for a
service. Example: Office of Personnel Management's training operation.
-Quasi-Government - The netherworld of federal corporations, government
sponsored enterprises and quasi-government organizations. Often an intermediate step
on the road to full privatization. Examples: Amtrak, Postal Service.
-Public-Private Partnerships - Any effort in which government and private
organizations share ownership of assets and operational responsibilities. Includes voucher
systems, franchise arrangements-even volunteer programs. Examples: Food stamps,
Medicare, and job-training programs.
-Contracting Out - The most common form of privatization: shifting the
provision of a good or service to the private sector by putting it out for competitive bid.
Examples: everything from construction of aircraft carriers and management of nuclear
weapons facilities to provision of landscaping services (Shoop, 1995: 17).
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Regulatory and Policy Guidance
Various laws contained in the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal years
1988-89 inhibited DoD's ability to outsource. Public Law 100-180, otherwise known as
the Nichols Amendment, allowed installation commanders to determine whether to
pursue outsourcing. The Department of Defense Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1991
contained Public Law 101-511, which prohibited funding for lengthy A-76 studies. The
National Defense Authorization Act for 1993-1994 prohibited DoD from entering into
contracts resulting from cost studies done under OMB Circular A-76, from October 23,
1992 to April 1,1994 (Armed Forces Information Service, 1996). Even though these
prohibitions have all lapsed, a number of provisions in Title 10, chapter 146 continue to
have an impact on the outsourcing decision. They include:
-Cost comparison studies are required if outsourcing impacts more than
10 positions.
-Congress must be notified of the results of any A-76 studies involving
more than 45 civilians.
-Annual reports to Congress are required on outsourcing.
-DoD is prohibited from outsourcing firefighters or security guards at
military installations.
-Outsourcing is prohibited for functions that are considered inherently
governmental.
-Military services must maintain the capability to accomplish 60% of
their depot-level maintenance organically.
Recent Problems and Concerns Regarding Outsourcing
The NPR and challenges identified in Joint Vision 2001 have been the main
drivers for recent acquisition streamlining legislation including: The Federal Acquisition
Streamling Act (FASA) of 1994, The Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA) of 1996,
and recent DoD 5000.1 and 5000.2 directives. Previous annual budgeting practices did
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not properly motivate government organizations to cut their expenses. If they did not
spend their entire annual budget, then the next year's budget was reduced accordingly.
This promoted waste and massive spending sprees at the end of the fiscal year. To
correct these inefficiencies, the Deputy Secretary of Defense signed a memorandum on
February 26,1996 stating that "Resources saved through these initiatives during the POM
process will not be decremented from your out-year budgets and should instead be
applied to your modernization priorities" (Armed Forces Information Service, 1996:25).
These pieces of acquisition legislation streamline the acquisition process, but do not
entirely eliminate the road blocks to outsourcing and privatization. Title 10 of the United
States Code (10 U.S.C.) still includes many hurdles to achieving the necessary funds to
meet the three challenges identified in Joint Vision 2001:
Provisions of law that impede achieving the benefits of minimized
costs and requisite readiness include: (1) Section 2466 of 10 U.S.C.
requires 60 percent of depot maintenance to be performed by Federal
Employees; (2) Section 2464 of 10 U.S.C. defines Core Logistics Functions
in terms of workload performed at specified facilities. This creates an
artificial constraint that hinders the DoD's ability to effectively manage its
depot maintenance facilities; (3) Section 2469 of 10 U.S.C. requires
public/private competitions before any workload in excess of $3 million
can be transferred to the private sector; (4) Section 2461 of 10 U.S.C.
requires four separate reports that DoD feels are unnecessary. In addition,
the extensive "how to" requirements create disincentives for DoD components
to pursue outsourcing. It also restricts the use of funds for cost comparison
studies that are not completed within 24 months; (5) Section 8020 of the DoD
Appropriations Act, 1996 requires the same detailed analysis of a function
involving 10 employees as it does a function involving 1,000 employees;
and (6) Section 317 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1987 exempts specific installations for political or other reasons. (Armed Forces
Information Service, 1996:15)
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Recent Developments
"In the 17-year period between 1979 and 1996, the Defense Department reviewed
about 90,000 positions for transfer to the private sector; through 2005, the department
says it will review 229,000 positions" (Peters, 1999: 20). DoD will compete more than
twice as many positions between 1997 and 2005 in one-third the time. Figure 1 shows
the number of positions planned for A-76 competitions between 1997 and 2002.
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Figure 1: Positions Planned for A-76 Competition (Peters, 1999:22)

History has shown that no matter who wins the competition, jobs will be reduced.
DoD competed 5,757 positions from October 1995 to March 1998. Table 1 shows that
while sixty percent of the competitions were awarded to contractors, 85 percent of the
positions were lost. There was a reduction in manpower even in those instances when the
government was the winner of the competition.
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Table 1. A-76 Competition Results From Oct. 1995 to Mar. 1998 (Peters, 1999: 24)

Tough Competition
Component
Army
Navy
Air Force
Defense
Commissary Agency
Defense Finance and
Accounting Service
Total

Total Positions
Reduced

m

2 (67%)
3 (100%)
24(59%)

Total
Positions
Competed
94
154
4,895

4

3 (75%)

95

91

2

0

519

257

53

32 (60%)

5,757

4,221

A-76
Studies
Completed
3
3

Contractor
Awarded

78
124
3,671

Last year Congress passed the Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act
which put even more pressure on federal agencies to outsource. This Act requires
Defense and other executive agencies to publish annually a list of activities that are not
inherently governmental but that are performed by a government source. This Act paves
the way for agencies to contract even more work. "Agencies won't publish their
commercial activities list until June 30, but word on the street is that DoD's inventory
will be the most aggressive by far" (Peters, 1999: 22).

F-117 Developments
In July 1995, General Henry Viccellio, Commander, Air Force Materiel
Command, cited the F-l 17 as a candidate for "Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) for
Life" to reduce total operating costs. This proposal eventually led to the decision to
outsource F-117 sustainment tasks that were being performed by the Sacremento Air
Logistics Center. The Total System Performance Responsibility (TSPR) contract, signed
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in October, 1998, transitioned responsibility for the following tasks from the government
to the contractor: item management, material management, warehousing, transportation,
supply support, sustaining engineering, program management, technical orders,
production management, configuration management, data management, test and
evaluation management, and safety. The transition of these responsibilities, in addition to
the actual maintenance the contractor was already performing, gave total control and
responsibility for depot-level maintenance to the contractor.
Recently, General George Babbitt, the Commander of AFMC, and the Program
Executive Officer for fighter/bombers, General Bolton, requested the F-117 System
Program Office to do a "business case." The business case is an effort to go back to the
beginning before the decision to outsource sustainment tasks was made in an effort to
validate the assumptions used in the decision. The intent is to establish a baseline so they
can compare projected savings with actual savings. The Program Office is interested in
reviewing the methodology and results of this thesis effort to assist it in completing thenbusiness case.

Chapter Summary
Recent GAO Reports and warnings from the corporate sector about outsourcing
have created the need for this research study (GAO Report, GAO/NSIAD-98-48,1997).
The GAO report entitled "Savings Achievable But Defense Science Board's Projections
Are Overstated" has sparked concern among Air Force leadership because many
organizations have included these projected savings in their out-year budgets. In
addition, in a report to the Senate Armed Services Committee on October 6th, 1998,
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Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen stated: "Without additional (base) closures we
will not achieve the $20 billion in projected savings in the years where some major
systems are scheduled to come on line" (Garamone, 1998: 25). The GAO report and
Secretary Cohen's statement are driving the desire for Air Force leaders to quantify the
savings that they are achieving from outsourcing. Although a great deal has been written
about why you should outsource, how you should outsource, and when you should
outsource, there has been nothing written on how to measure and /or determine whether
or not outsourcing is a better overall value than maintaining the in-house capability. The
purpose of this study is to explore traditional techniques in business research to determine
whether: 1) one can develop a reliable snapshot of how effective outsourcing is as an
alternative to organic solutions; and 2) determine whether analytical lessons learned from
this application can be generalized and applied to future valuation assessments.
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III. Methodology
Chapter Overview
As stated in previous sections of this thesis, the goal of this research is to
determine whether or not outsourcing of depot-level maintenance is a better value than
organically performed depot-level maintenance. Our proposition is that outsourcing the
F-117 depot-level maintenance is a better value than organically performed maintenance.
A finding inconsistent with this proposition suggests that more research is necessary.
Archival data reflecting cost and key performance indicators from the last two years were
compared to identical cost and performance factors reflecting contractor performance
since inception of the Total System Performance Responsibility (TSPR) contract. We
sought to measure perceived customer satisfaction by comparing satisfaction levels
before and after the TSPR contract was awarded. By comparing customer satisfaction
data to the results of the archival analysis, we should be able to determine if the Air Force
is, or is not, obtaining a better value through outsourcing.

Research Approach
To test our proposition, we used archival data to compare the government's
performance to the contractor's performance. Technical performance was measured
against the metrics tracked by Air Combat Command (ACC) with the Monthly Aircraft
Logistics Indicators Report (9302 Report), a report used to measure logistics indicators
for all ACC aircraft. These performance metrics include: mission capable (MC) rate,
total non-mission capable supply (TNMCS) rate, mission capable (MICAP) delivery,
replacement spare parts (RSP) kit fill rate, depot delivery, depot quality, deficiency report
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(DR) response rate, and weapon system trainer (WST) availability. These same
performance metrics, with the exception of the MC rate, are contained in the TSPR
contract and are used to gauge the contractor's performance. Our evaluation of these
factors considered the number of monthly sorties flown. The amount of award fee the
contractor receives is dependent upon how well it performs against these metrics. We are
using actual cost and performance data from fiscal years 1997 and 1998. We believe
that, due to the time of contractor take over, age of the fleet, number of sorties flown, and
total aircraft in the inventory during this period, that the most common conditions exist to
make a fair comparison. Earlier data is available; however, we cannot verify its
reliability and it would require the leveling of several confounds. It must be noted that
the contractor has always performed the actual hands-on maintenance due to the unique
nature of the aircraft material. Prior to the decision to have the contractor assume total
responsibility for depot-level maintenance, the government controlled development and
acquisition, program management, sustainment, budgeting, contracting, and security.
Sustainment tasks include item management, material management, warehousing,
transportation, supply support, sustaining engineering, program management, tech orders,
production management, configuration management, data management, test and
evaluation management, and safety. Under the TSPR contract awarded 1 October 1998
(beginning FY 1999), the contractor assumed all sustainment responsibilities.
To supplement the archival analysis of before and after TSPR cost and
performance data, we supported our findings by soliciting customer satisfaction
information. To examine the customer's perceived increase or decrease in value, we
questioned the customers using a Likert five-point comparative ranking scale (Cooper

22

and Emory, 1995). This questionnaire serves two purposes. First, the questionnaire
results are key indicators of customer satisfaction both before and after the TSPR contract
was awarded. This comparison assisted us in our attempt to examine whether or not
outsourcing is a better value. Second, the questionnaire is an indicator of the validity of
the performance indicators used to measure the contractor's performance. For example,
if the archival data indicate that the contractor is meeting or exceeding all performance
indicators, but the customer is not satisfied with performance, this may indicate that the
wrong metrics are being used to measure performance.

Instrument Implementation
The questionnaire is a short, thirteen question Likert-type questionnaire that was
directed at those with knowledge of the depot supply process and how it was affected by
the award of the TSPR contract. These groups include supply, expediter, inspection and
acceptance, and senior maintenance personnel who track or are aware of the differences
in the level of performance. The individuals are from the same units that provide input to
the award fee board. Originally, we planned on selecting a random sample of these
groups, but were unable to obtain a list of all candidates available in these groups due to
ongoing deployment operations. The Commander of the F-l 17 fighter wing at Holloman
AFB forwarded the questionnaire by email and tasked his leadership to forward it to key
personnel. The number of personnel available to answer the questionnaire was limited
due to an increased operations tempo caused by the deployment of unit personnel to
Kosovo. While not random, we believe the selection of participants is valid for purposes
of our study. The distribution of questionnaires to key personnel should improve the
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quality of responses. Once responses were received, the data were analyzed to show how
each value determinant affected the response variable. Because outsourcing is viewed by
some as a sensitive subject, we addressed concerns of anonymity and fear of retribution
by ensuring that respondents' names were kept anonymous.

Data Collection Process
The questionnaire is provided in Appendix B, and relates primarily to established
performance parameters. It also deals with the perception of overall improved efficiency,
quality, and working relationship between the depot and the flight-line maintenance
personnel. The target population of the questionnaire was those with knowledge of the
depot supply process and how the award of the TSPR contract affected it. These
personnel had knowledge of factors relating to MC rates, TNMCS rates, MICAP
delivery, RSP Kit fill rates, depot delivery, depot quality, DR response rates, and WST
availability. They are also in the position to determine if these are the proper factors to
use to measure the contractor's performance.

Limitations
The scope of this study is limited by several factors. First, the contractor has only
been responsible for total system performance for seven months and for the last three
months has been supporting deployments to Kosovo. This is important because under
TSPR some of the performance metrics are relaxed until the aircraft return from the
theatre. Also, upon inception of the contract, the contractor assumed control of a
warehouse full of government acquired spare parts. In addition, the contractor was not
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held accountable for performance metrics on aircraft in process during the change over.
As a result, the first quarter data does not accurately reflect the contractor's ability to
perform. Second, because of the recent deployments, operations tempo data normally
available is considered sensitive and therefore not accounted for in this analysis. Third,
we realize the historical cost data being compared may not accurately reflect a
comparison against the government's most efficient organization (MEO) costs. Although
the F-l 17 Program Office did accomplish an MEO, it was not used as a cost baseline
because the decision was already made to have the jobs remain in California. Also, other
costs, such as employment relocation programs, early retirement incentives, and
additional DCMC involvement, are not accounted for in the SPO's estimate of the costs to
convert sustainment to contractor control. Finally, we were unable to analyze the impact
of spares funding levels during the before and after periods, which could have a
significant impact on the ability of either party to meet or exceed the performance
metrics.

Chapter Summary
This chapter provides an overview of our research methodology. It explains our
research approach, instrument implementation, data collection, and limiting factors. The
purpose of this chapter was to prepare the reader for the detailed analysis that appears in
Chapter 4, and make the reader aware of the factors that limit this research effort.
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IV. Analysis and Results
Chapter Overview
The purpose of this analysis is to examine if outsourcing of the F-l 17 sustainment
effort is a better value to the government than organic support. The value of this
information is that the AF decision-maker will have a single case study that will provide
information useful for making future outsourcing decisions.
The data are presented in the following sequence. First, a detailed cost analysis is
presented examining the actual and perceived financial value to the AF. Next, we present
results comparing performance metrics. This is followed by a discussion of the customer
satisfaction questionnaires and expert interviews. Finally, we present a triangulation of
the cost, performance, and customer satisfaction information.

Cost Comparison
A detailed analysis comparing costs, MC rates, TNMCS rates, MICAP delivery,
RSP Kit fill rate, depot delivery, depot quality, DR response, and WST availability before
and after sustainment responsibilities were transferred to the contractor was performed.
Actual cost and performance data from fiscal years 1997 and 1998 were compared to
contractor performance data from October 1998 through April 1999. The results of this
analysis were compared to the results of the customer satisfaction questionnaire and
expert interviews.
Figure 2 and Table 2 are graphical and tabular representations of the program
office's estimate of savings resulting from the transfer of sustainment responsibilities
from the government to a contractor. The figure identifies two potential savings profiles;
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one assumes stable F-117 program funding and the other assumes unstable funding. As
of the completion date of this report, stable funding beyond FY99 has not been
authorized. The "requirement without TSPR" costs are an estimate of what it would have
cost the government to accomplish sustainment efforts without the TSPR contract. The
amounts are calculated using FY98 actual government sustainment costs as a baseline,
escalated three percent per year to cover projected inflation. The F-117 Program Office
made a business decision to not escalate Government personnel costs. This decision
tends to understate projected savings.
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Figure 2. Program Office's Estimate of Savings From TSPR (F-117 Program Office)

27

Table 2. Program Office's Estimate of Savings From TSPR (F-l 17 Program Office)

Rqmnts
Fiscal Year without TSPR
FY96
FY97
FY98
FY99
FYOO
FY01
FY02
FY03
FY04
FY05
FY06
Tot 99-06

191.8
184.9
187.3
192.9
198.7
204.7
210.8
217.1
223.6
230.4
237.3
1715.5
Savings
99-06

TSPR vs Without TSPR
Cost Comparison vs Inflation
Tot Rqmnts TSPR without
SPO West Manning
Stable $
without TSPR
203.4
196.5
198.9
204.5
210.3
216.3
222.4
228.7
235.2
242
248.9
1808.6

11.58
11.58
11.64
11.64
11.64
11.64
11.64
11.64
11.64
11.64
11.64
93.1

TSPRwith
Stable $

185.3
197.4
201.5
209.2
215.2
• 225.7
233.5
240.3
1708.1

181
194.7
193.7
199.7
201.2
208.6
216.8
232.4
1628.1

100.5
100.5
TSPR w/o Stable $
180.5
TSPR w/ Stable $
This reduction is an estimate of the reduction of ALC
personnal

180.5
-2.94
-177.6

From Table 2, above, the AF projected savings is $177.6 million over the life of
the sustainment contract. This level of projected savings assumes the government is able
to fully fund the TSPR contract so the contractor can negotiate long-term contractual
relationships with their subcontractors and can implement other long-term cost savings
initiatives. Without full funding the contract would need to be renegotiated resulting in a
loss of savings. The AF calculated the projected savings by developing an estimate of
what it would have cost the government to provide the identical level of support and
compared this estimate to the actual contract amount at target price. The AF estimate
was developed by escalating the AF sustainment costs for fiscal year 1998 by three
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percent per year projected over the life of the contract. The savings are calculated by
subtracting the actual contract amount, at target price, from the government's estimate of
what it would have cost the AF to accomplish this same level of work. The only direct
comparison that can be made is between the estimated cost for the government to provide
sustainment services during FY99 if the TSPR contract was not awarded and the
projected contract cost for FY99. The government estimate was based on the assumption
that the same level of service would be provided by the government. It must be noted
that only seven months of cost history is available from the TSPR contract. The amount
used for comparison purposes is the estimate to complete provided by the TSPR
contractor. The projected cost under TSPR based on the estimate to complete for fiscal
year 1999 equates to $177.6 million. The contract contains a provision that encourages
contractor efficiencies by sharing any savings below the $181 million target price 50/50
between the government and the contractor. The contractor is projecting a $3.4 million
under-run, of which the government share is $1.7 million. The savings to the government
for FY99 equates to $25.2 million. This represents the difference between the
government estimate of what it would have cost to perform the effort minus the contract
price at target, plus the government's share of the under-run.
In conclusion, the TSPR contract appears to offer significant financial savings to
the government as compared to what it would have cost the government to accomplish
sustainment tasks at the same level of support. Although there is no guarantee that
contractor cost performance will be better or worse during the life of the contract; the
analysis provides an initial look at contractor cost performance from which a projection
of future savings, if any, can be estimated.
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Technical Performance
Technical performance was gauged by comparing the performance before
sustainment responsibility was transferred to the contractor with performance after
transfer. Performance was measured against pre-established standards. The same
standards were applied with two exceptions. The TSPR contractor is not held
accountable for meeting the MC rate because many of the factors influencing this rate are
under government control. Also, the standard for Total Non-Mission Capable Supply
(TNMCS) was reduced from seven percent to five percent for contractor performance.
The contractor is held to a higher standard because the AF retained responsibility for
parts the government must supply.
Table 3 presents a comparison of the government's performance for fiscal years
1997 and 1998 and contractor performance for the first seven months of fiscal year 1999
under TSPR. The comparison is based on the performance metrics in the contract with
the exception of the MC rate.
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Table 3: Performance Comparison Non-TSPR vs TSPR (F-l 17 Performance Metrics)
Metric
MCRate(%)
TNMCSRate(%)
MtCAP Del (Hrs)
RSP Fill Rate (%)

STD
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Oct
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Nov
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Table 4 compares the pre-TSPR average performance levels for fiscal years 1997
and 1998 with the contractor's average performance for the first seven months of fiscal
year 1999. The analysis of the data in Tables 3 and 4 indicates that fronra technical

perspective, performance was generally satisfactory both prior to and after transfer of
sustainment responsibility to the contractor. The performance indicators for the seven
months since the TSPR contract was signed are higher for four of the seven performance
indicators used to measure the contractor under the TSPR contract, and tied for a fifth.
Note that depot quality is a single performance indicator; however, major and minor
discrepancies have been separated for ease of comparison.

Table 4: Average Performance Levels
Metric
MC Rate (%)
TNMCS Rate (%)
MICAP Delivery(Hrs)
RSP Fill Rate (%)
Depot Delivery (Days)
Depot Quality Majors
Depot Quality Minors
DR Response (Days)
WST Availability (%)

Avg97
S3$0
4.39
61.74
98.74
N/A
N/A
N/A
0.11
99.81

Avg98
78.92
5.98
63.31
99.23
1.79
2.07
1.43
0.00
99.80

Avg99
83.56
2.69
38.37,
99.03
0,00
2.19
2.49
0-00
99.99

The different lengths of the performance periods pose concerns, but by comparing
sortie rates we can reasonably correlate the two data points. Figure 3 shows the level of
sorties flown during the periods we are comparing. With the exception of September
1997, the sortie rates have been relatively stable each month. The data for that month is
much lower because the fleet was grounded after an aircraft crashed. Figure 3 is
significant because it indicates that sustainment tasks required during fiscal years 97 and
98 and the first seven months of fiscal year 99 are based on comparable sortie rates.
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F-117 Sorties Flown
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Figure 3: F-117 Sorties Flown by Fiscal Year
From Figure 3 above, the average number of monthly sorties for FY97 is 613
(excluding September), 555 for FY98, and 585 for FY99. The results and analysis of
each performance indicator follow.
Mission Capable Rate: The standard is 80%. Several factors comprise this rate,
some of which are not under contractor control. Nonetheless, we are including this
performance indicator in our analysis because many of the metrics for which the
contractor is held accountable significantly impact this rate. The average mission capable
rate for the first seven months under TSPR is 83.56%. This rate, statistically, is not
significantly different from the pre-TSPR FY97 rate, but is a 5.9% improvement over the
observed performance during FY98. The monthly rate under TSPR exceeds the standard
on average; however, the standard was not met for the month of April 1999. We cannot
determine if the failure to meet standard was affected by contractor performance. A
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number of F-l 17's are deployed to Kosovo, significantly stretching the supply line, and
more than likely having an impact on this factor.
Total Non Mission Capable Supply: The standard set by ACC is 7%. The
standard under TSPR is 5% because the government retains responsibility for furnishing
parts managed by the other services or the Defense Logistics Agency. The average
monthly rate under TSPR is 2.69%, which easily exceeds the standard; however, the
contractor failed to satisfy the standard during the month of April 1999. Again, this
failure could be attributed, at least in part, to the Kosovo deployment. The rate under
TSPR exceeds the 5% standard by 46.2%, the pre-TSPR rate for FY97 exceeds the 7%
standard by 37.3%, and the FY98 rate exceeds the 7% standard by 14.6%.
MICAP Delivery: The standard is 72 hours. The average monthly performance
under TSPR of 38.57 hours is a 37.5% improvement over the pre-TSPR FY97 rate and a
39% improvement over FY98 performance. The contractor has far exceeded the standard
of 72 hours every month (except for the first month); however, it must be noted that the
contractor was not held accountable for aircraft work in process until February 1999. A
significant increase in the number of hours to deliver during the month of April 1999 was
thought to be because of one particular part. Delivery time is expected to drop again in
May.
RSP Kit Fill Rate: The standard for this performance indicator is 96%. The
average monthly RSP Kit fill rate under TSPR, 99.03%, exceeds the 96% standard.
There is no statistically significant difference between performance under TSPR and preTSPR. The contractor easily met the standard each of the seven months.
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Depot Delivery: The standard for this performance indicator is 1 day. The
performance under TSPR exceeded the standard each of the seven months. Performance
under TSPR exceeded the pre-TSPR FY98 performance by an average of 1.79 days per
month. The government's performance exceeded the standard all but the first two
months. It took 14 days to deliver in October and 7.5 days to deliver in November; all
other months were zero. Data is not available for this performance indicator for FY97.
Depot Quality: The standard for depot quality allows for four major, and ten
minor discrepancies. Although there is no statistically significant difference between
performance under TSPR and performance during FY98 in regard to major discrepancies,
performance under TSPR exceeded the standard each of the seven months. Performance
under TSPR also exceeds the standard often minor discrepancies each of the seven
months; however, performance under TSPR for minor discrepancies was 74.1% below
the FY98 performance. Data is not available for FY97 for this performance indicator.
Delinquent Deficiency Reports: The standard for this performance indicator is 5
days. The performance under TSPR exceeded the standard each of the seven months.
There is no statistically significant difference between performance under TSPR and
performance during FY97 and FY98.
WSTAvailability: The standard for Weapon System Trainer availability is 97%.
The performance under TSPR exceeded this standard each of the seven months. The
performance level under TSPR was 100% every month except April 1999, when
availability dropped slightly to 99.9%. There is no statistically significant difference
between performance under TSPR and performance during FY97 and FY98.
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Looking only at the seven performance indicators used to measure the TSPR
contractor's performance, it would appear that there is little difference between average
monthly performance before and after TSPR. We did not attempt to gauge the
importance of the performance indicators; however, it should be noted that performance
under TSPR was lower for depot quality than during the FY98 pre-TSPR period. In
addition the mission capable rate under TSPR is below that experienced during F Y97, but
higher than that experienced during FY98. In conclusion, it appears that technical
performance is not the controlling factor to determine if outsourcing sustainment tasks for
the F-l 17 is a better value than organic support. Without the added value of significant
cost savings, the decision to outsource could not be supported.

Questionnaire Results
The customer satisfaction questionnaire serves two purposes. First, the
questionnaire results are key indicators of customer satisfaction both before and after the
TSPR contract was awarded. This assisted us in our attempt to examine whether or not
outsourcing is a better value. Second, the questionnaire is an indicator of the validity of
the performance indicators used to measure the contractor's performance. For example,
if the archival data indicate that the contractor is meeting or exceeding all performance
indicators, but the customer is not satisfied with performance, this may indicate that the
wrong metrics are being used to measure performance.
Our original plan was to telephonically interview a randomly selected sample
from the total population of F-l 17 maintenance personnel. The Logistics Commander of
the 49th Logistics Group informed us that the hands-on maintenance technicians would
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have little, if any, insight into the differences in the performance indicators under TSPR
compared to pre-TSPR. In addition, the Kosovo deployment and resultant increase in
operations tempo has greatly increased the workload of F-l 17 maintenance personnel,
further limiting our access to them. He proposed that we provide the questionnaire to
senior level individuals only. We suggested he include personnel from supply, quality
assurance, and expediters along with the senior maintenance personnel. As a result, the
Commander provided the questionnaire to all of the senior personnel from those four
groups. The responses were gathered and forwarded to us via mail.
The questionnaire consists of thirteen questions. The first five questions capture
demographic information such as rank, job title, years of experience working on the
F-l 17, education level, and career skill level. The next seven questions measure the
difference, as perceived by the customers, in the performance indicators used to measure
both organic support prior to TSPR and contractor support under the TSPR contract. The
final question is intended to examine if the performance indicators presently used to
assess performance under TSPR are the best indicators of performance and to elicit
suggestions for improving the performance indicators.
A total of 30 questionnaires were returned. Not all questions relating to the
performance indicators were answered on each questionnaire. The number of responses
range from 20 responses (out of 30) on question 9 to a maximum of 25 responses on
questions 6 and 7. We can only speculate that respondents failed to answer certain
questions because they lacked insight into performance in relation to the performance
indicators. This is evidenced by some of the responses to question 13.
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The analysis begins with question 6, which is the first question that measures the
customer's perception of the difference in the quality of service received under TSPR
compared to pre-TSPR. The analysis examines the results of each questionnaire response
with respect to the performance indicators to determine whether or not the customer's
perception matches the archival data collected. We examine the responses of the entire
group first. If there are discrepancies between the questionnaire responses and the
archival data, we will analyze other factors such as education level, skill level, and the
number of years of experience working on the F-l 17 to see if there is any dependant
variable relationship.
MC Rate: The questionnaire did not ask the perceived difference in MC rates
because performance in the other areas being measured determines the MC rate. In
addition, the contractor is not held accountable for this rate because many of the factors
influencing this rate are under government control. By analyzing the results of each
question and comparing it to the archival data we can reach conclusions regarding
whether or not contractor performance impacts the MC rate.
TNMCSRate: The archival analysis indicates that performance under TSPR
exceeds the standard and is higher than performance during FY97 and FY98. Of the 30
respondents to the questionnaire, 1 reported that performance was much better, 11
reported somewhat better, 11 reported no change, 2 reported somewhat worse, and 5
failed to respond. The results of the questionnaire indicate that the customers perceive
the contractors performance to be equal to or better than performance prior to TSPR for
this performance indicator.
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MICAP Delivery: The archival analysis indicates that performance under TSPR
reduced the delivery time by more than half for the months of November through March,
FY99. The responses to the questionnaire for this metric show that of the 30 respondents
6 reported a marginal decrease in performance, 14 reported no change, 5 reported
somewhat of an increase in performance, and 5 failed to respond. The results of the
questionnaire indicate that 19 of the 25 customers that responded to this question
perceive the contractors performance to be equal to or better than performance prior to
TSPR for this performance indicator. However, it must be noted that the contractor
taking possession of the government's spare parts warehouse may have affected the first
quarter data.
RSP Kit Fill Rate: The archival analysis indicates that performance under TSPR
exceeds that experienced prior to TSPR during FY 97, but falls slightly short of the FY
98 performance rate. Performance under TSPR has exceeded the standard each of the
seven months. The responses to the questionnaire for this metric show that of the 30
respondents, 1 indicates much better performance, 6 indicate somewhat better
performance, 13 reported no change, 4 reported somewhat worse performance, and 6
failed to respond. The results of the questionnaire indicate that 20 of the 24 customers
that responded to this question perceive that performance under TSPR to be equal to or
better than performance prior to TSPR for this performance indicator.
Depot Delivery: The archival analysis indicates that performance under TSPR
exceeds the pre-TSPR FY 98 performance and exceeds the standard for each of the seven
months. Data are not available for this performance indicator for FY97. The responses
to the questionnaire for this metric show that of the 30 respondents, 20 reported no
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change, 1 reported somewhat of an increase in delivery time, and 9 failed to respond.
The results of the questionnaire indicate that 20 of the 21 customers that responded to this
question perceive no change in performance for this performance indicator.
Depot Quality: The archival analysis indicates that performance under TSPR
exceeds the standard; however, it is slightly below the pre-TSPR performance during F Y
98. FY 97 data was not available for this metric. Of the 30 respondents to the
questionnaire, 5 reported a greatly decreased number of discrepancies, 1 reported
somewhat of a decrease, 9 reported no change, 5 reported somewhat of an increase in the
number of discrepancies, and 10 failed to respond. The results of the questionnaire
indicate that 15 of the 20 perceived equal or better performance under TSPR; however, 5
of the 20 respondents reported a degradation of performance.
Delinquent Deficiency Reports: The archival analysis indicates that performance
under TSPR exceeds the standard each of the seven months. This performance was equal
to the F Y 98 pre-TSPR performance and significantly better than F Y 97 performance. Of
the 30 respondents to the questionnaire, 1 reported a greatly decreased number of
delinquent deficiency reports, 3 reported somewhat of a decrease, 14 reported no change,
3 reported somewhat of an increase in the number of delinquent reports, and 9 failed to
respond. The results of the questionnaire indicate that 18 of the 21 perceived equal or
better performance under TSPR.
WSTAvailability: The archival analysis indicates that the WST availability under
TSPR exceeds the standard each of the seven months. Availability under TSPR slightly
exceeded the pre TSPR availability of FY97 and FY98; however, the FY97 and FY98
availability also exceeded the standard. We did not survey the group on this performance
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metric because it was believed that they would not have insight into the availability of the
trainer.
Overall Maintenance Relationship: This is not one of the measured performance
indicators nor is archival data available to support this analysis; however, we believe the
working relationship between the 49th Logistics Squadron and the place of depot repair is
a significant indicator of perceived customer satisfaction. Of the 30 respondents to the
questionnaire, 1 reported a greatly improved relationship, 10 reported the relationship
was somewhat improved, 10 reported no change, 1 reported the relationship was
somewhat worse, and 8 failed to respond. The results of the questionnaire indicate that
21 of the 22 respondents perceived an equal or better working relationship between the
two organizations under TSPR.
The final question sought to determine if the correct performance indicators are
being measured. The results of the questionnaire produced no significant responses.
Only 5 respondents answered the question and none of them indicated any significant
changes to the existing metrics. One did indicate that deployment initiatives should be
considered while another said the metrics were good, but that the survey had come about
6 months too early. The respondent stated that "some indicators have not had enough
time to be properly surveyed."
Table 5 summarizes the respondent's answers to the questionnaire. The following
are the possible answers for each value question.
Questions:
1
2
3

6&8

Much Better
Somewhat Better
No Change

7.9.10.11
Greatly Decreased
Somewhat Decreased
Has Not Changed

41

12
Greatly Improved
Somewhat Improved
Has Not Changed

4
5

Somewhat Worse
Much Worse

Somewhat Increased
Greatly Increased

Somewhat Worse
Much Worse

The following 5 responses were received on question 13:
-

Respondent 13 stated "need to look at deployment initiatives - there are none."

-

Respondent 19 stated "performance indicators are good, perhaps the survey is about
6-months early! Some indicators have not had enough time to be properly surveyed."

-

Respondent 24 suggested we look at "repair times at the depot (how long it takes
them to repair an asset). We should also watch depot repair costs," and stated
"Overall, I am satisfied with the support I have received."

-

Respondent 25 suggested we look at "Depot repair times, repair costs, and total
turnaround time." They also stated "all in all I think we can make money with the
TSPR system."

-

Respondent 28 stated "haven't been here before Oct. 9.1 don't really know what
TSPR is or what it does for me. Good job in meeting surge requirements for example
heat shields."
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Table 5: Customer Satisfaction Questionnaire Responses
1
2
3
4

5
6
7
8

5
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

17
18
15
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

B
A
1
Question
Respondent
SSGT
1
TSGT
2
MSGT
3
SSGT
4
TSGT
5
CMSGT
6

G H I

J

k

6 7 8

9

10 11 12

L

M

C

D

2

3

E
4

F
5

0-1
9+
9+
9+
8to9
4to5

HS
HS
HS
Assoc.
HS
Assoc.

7-level
7-level
7-level
7-level
7-level
9-level

3
3
3
3
3
4

2
3
3
2
3
4

4 2,3,4 3
1
3
3
3
1
3
1
3
3
1
3
4
3
4

0-1
0-1
6 to 7
2 to 3
0-1
0-1
2 to 3

HS
HS
HS
Assoc.
HS
MS
Assoc.

7-level
7-level
7-level
7-level
7-level
7-level
NA
NA

3
2
2
2
2
2
2

3
4
2
3
3
2
3

2
2
1
3
3
3
3

3
3
1
2
-

3
3
3
3
-

3
3
1
4
-

3
2
1
2
2
2

2 to 3
0-1
4 to 5
2 to 3
0-1
0-1

Assoc.
Assoc.
BA
BA
Assoc.
HS

7-level
7-level
9-level
3-level
7-level
7-level

4
2
2
2
2
2

3
4
2
2
4
3

4
3
2
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4
-

3
3
3
3
3
-

3
3
3
2
2
-

4
2
2
2
2
-

4 to 5
6 to 7
6 to 7
4 to 5
4 to 5
4 to 5
2 to 3
0-1
6 to 7
6 to 7

Assoc.
HS
BA
BA
Assoc.
Assoc.
MS
MS
Assoc.
MS

7-level
7-level
9-level
7-level
9-level
7-level
NA
NA
9-level
9-level

3
3
3
3
-

3
3
3
4
-

4
2
2
3
-

3
3
3
3
-

3
3
3
3
-

3
3
3
3
-

3
2
2
3
-

3 3 3
1 3 2

3
3

3
3

3
3

3
3

Quality Assurance
4 2,3
3 3
3 3
2 3
3 3
4 3

Supply Squadron
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

TSGT
TSGT
MSGT

TSGT
MSGT
TSGT
MAJOR
CMSGT
49 OG

15
16
17
18
19
20

SMSGT
MSGT
CMSGT
2LT
MSGT
TSGT

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

SMSGT
MSGT
SMSGT
TSGT
MSGT
MSGT
COL
CAPT
CMSGT
CMSGT

MX Squadron

Expert Interviews
Each interviewee was asked to provide their opinion on the three investigative
questions. The three investigative questions are:
(1) Are the contract performance metrics good indicators of better value1?
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(2) Has the decision to outsource F-117 depot-level maintenance provided a better value
to the Air Force?
(3) If outsourcing F-117 depot maintenance is an equal or better value, do we still want
to give up the potential core capability?
The intent of these interviews is to obtain information on the intangible benefits or
detriments to outsourcing the F-l 17 sustainment effort. Key senior individuals with
knowledge of F-l 17 depot support were interviewed. A summary of their comments
follows.
In general each of the interviewees stated that the metrics used to measure
performance under the TSPR contract are proper measures of a better value, except they
did not account for the intangibles like responsiveness. In most instances, the
interviewees believed that responsiveness is significantly improved under the TSPR
contract.
All of the interviewees indicated that outsourcing the F-l 17 sustainment effort has
resulted in a better value to the Air Force.
On the question of core capability, all of the interviewees stated that the
government has lost very little core capability due to the fact that the contractor has
always performed the maintenance on this aircraft. However, they stated that we did lose
some core capability in sustaining engineering and asset management. The consensus
was that the loss of the core capability was small when compared to the projected $177.6
million financial savings over the life of the TSPR contract.
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Triangulation
Data related to contractor performance was collected from three sources: archival,
customer satisfaction questionnaires and expert interviews. Our analysis of the archival
data establishes that performance under the TSPR contract has been equal to or better
than performance prior to the award of the TSPR contract during FY97 and FY98, when
measured by the performance indicators described elsewhere in this report. Our analysis
of the customer satisfaction questionnaire results also indicates that the customer has
found performance under TSPR to be equal to or better. And finally, the data gained
through the expert interviews support the analysis of the archival data and the customer
satisfaction questionnaire results. In conclusion, it appears that technical performance
alone is not the controlling factor to determine if outsourcing sustainment tasks for the F117 is a better value than organic support.
In the case of the F-l 17, cost savings appear to be the primary determinant of
whether or not outsourcing is a better overall value to the Air Force. Current projections
indicate savings of $25.2 million for FY99 alone. Savings for the life of the TSPR
contract are estimated to be $177.6 million. This, coupled with the intangibles like
improved responsiveness and improved working relationships identified during the expert
interviews, appears to show that outsourcing the F-l 17 is a better value to the Air Force.
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V. Summary and Conclusions
Chapter Overview
The Department of Defense must reduce its cost of support services if it is to meet
national security goals as long as personnel and budgets continue to decline. Army
Secretary Louis Caldera, Navy Secretary Richard Denzig and Acting Air force Secretary
F. Whitten Peters, in a joint letter, said the BRAC process is "the only tool we have
available to divest ourselves of unneeded infrastructure, consolidate missions and free
funds to improve priority programs on the scale that we know is required" (Garamone,
1999: 13). In addition, the "24-star letter" signed by Chairman Army Gen. Henry
Shelton, Vice Chairman Air Force Gen. Joseph Ralston, and service chiefs Army Gen.
Dennis Reimer, Marine Corps Gen. Charles Krulak, Navy Adm. Jay Johnston and Air
Force Gen. Michael Ryan noted that studies show that DoD has "23 percent excess
capacity"(Garamone, 1999: 13). The letter goes on to say "BRAC is the single most
effective tool for the services to realign their infrastructure to meet the needs of changing
organizations and to respond to new ways of doing business. No other initiative can
substitute for BRAC in terms of ability to reduce and reshape infrastructure. Simply
stated, our military judgement is that further base closures are absolutely necessary"
(Garamone, 1999: 13). In spite of these statements and recommendations by our military
leaders, attempts at obtaining savings for modernization by closing bases and reducing
unnecessary infrastructure have met with considerable resistance. This avenue of savings
appears to be a questionable source. At least for the short term, outsourcing and
privatization appear to be the methods of choice for reducing support costs.
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Previous chapters have identified DoD's plans for outsourcing over the next five
years. Organizations have reduced their future year's budget requests in anticipation of
the projected savings resulting from these outsourcing projections. While statistics show
that manning drops even when the government wins the competition, there is no proof
that direct savings will result. Recent GAO reports indicate that the government
activities involved in outsourcing have failed to accurately assess the true costs of
outsourcing, and have likely overestimated projected savings. Our study has found that
in the case of the F-l 17, there was little research to determine if the projected savings are
real. The costs to downsize the government workforce were not considered because
McClellan Air Force base, where the depot was located, was slated for closure.
This chapter reviews the results of our research with respect to the investigative
questions first introduced in Chapter 1. First, it discusses whether the performance
indicators being used to measure contractor performance are valid. Next, it examines if
outsourcing the F-l 17 sustainment tasks have led to a better overall value to the Air
force. Finally, if the answer to the second question is yes, it examines if the additional
value to the Air Force justifies the loss of control of a core logistics function.
The purpose of this research was to examine the results of the decision to
outsource the F-l 17 sustainment tasks. While there are many limiting factors to our
research, such as the limited length of time since the effort was outsourced, the almost
immediate deployment to Kosovo, and a lack of competition between the public and
private sector, many conclusions can be inferred from the analysis.
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The chapter ends with a summary of conclusions drawn from the research,
recommendations on how this research might be employed to enhance future outsourcing
decisions, and recommendations for future studies.

Review of Investigative Questions
Question 1
Are the contract performance metrics good indicators of better value?
The performance metrics selected to measure contractor performance under the
TSPR contract are identical to those used by Air Combat Command (ACC) to measure
performance of all aircraft under their control. The metrics used to measure performance
are: mission capable rate, total non mission capable rate, MICAP delivery, RSP kit fill
rate, depot delivery, depot quality, delinquent deficiency report rate, and weapon system
trainer availability rate. We had two criteria for measuring the suitability of the selected
performance measurements. The first criterion is whether the metrics can be used to
compare performance before the TSPR contract with performance after TSPR. The
second criterion is whether the customer perceives the metrics as adequate performance
indicators.
We used historical performance data for the pre-TSPR FY97 and FY98 periods
and actual contractor performance data accumulated since the beginning of the TSPR
contract on 1 October 1998 for our comparison. We found the metrics adequate to use as
a basis of comparison of performance before and after TSPR. Results from the customer
satisfaction questionnaire were used to determine if the customers perceived the metrics
as adequate indicators of performance. The results of our analysis of the questionnaire
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data support the use of the existing performance indicators. In addition, the expert
interviews also supported the use of the metrics, but suggested that intangibles like
working relationship and responsiveness should be considered.
Question 2
Has the decision to outsource the responsibility for the F-l 17 depot-level maintenance
provided a better value to the Air force?
The answer to this question forms the core of our research. We collected data
from three sources to examine this question. Historical costs for F-l 17 sustainment were
gathered from the F-l 17 System Program Office. This data was used as the baseline to
compare what it cost to perform the effort before the TSPR contract was awarded to the
cost of performance under the TSPR contract. Historical cost data for FY97 and FY98,
along with the government's projection of "what it would have cost the government to
continue the same level of support" during FY99 through FY06 was obtained. A
comparison can be made between the government's projected costs from FY99 through
FY06 to the actual contractor cost under TSPR. Historical technical performance data
was collected for the FY97 and FY98 time periods. This data was compared to
performance date generated under the TSPR contract to determine if the Air Force is
obtaining a better value in terms of performance.
A second source of performance data was elicited from the customer satisfaction
questionnaires. Responses to the questionnaire allowed us to examine the customer's
perception of performance before TSPR to performance after TSPR. We can draw
conclusions from the correlation of these two data points to examine if the Air Force is
receiving a better value under TSPR from the customer's perspective.
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Additionally, we solicited comments from senior level experts familiar with
F-117 sustainment to obtain their assessment of performance before and after TSPR. To
arrive at our conclusion we triangulated the data from the three sources: archival,
customer satisfaction questionnaire, and expert interviews.
The projected savings for FY99, based on the contractor's estimate to complete,
equate to $25.2 million. Looking solely at cost as the indicator, the TSPR contract is
providing a better value to the government.
Our analysis indicates that there is little difference between the level of
sustainment support prior to TSPR and the level of sustainment support after award of the
TSPR contract. The final driver, in the case of the F-117, appears to be cost.
The customer satisfaction questionnaire indicates that the customers perceive
sustainment support before and after award of the TSPR contract to be comparable.
Question 3
If outsourcing F-117 depot maintenance is an equal or better value, do we still want to
give up the potential the core capability?
Our only source of insight into this question is the expert interviews. One
limiting factor affecting our research is the short length of time since the TSPR contract
was awarded. Although much has happened during that period, like the Kosovo
deployment, seven months of performance is not sufficient time from which to draw
conclusions.
On the question of core capability, all of the interviewees stated that the
government has lost very little core capability due to the fact that the contractor has
always performed the maintenance on this aircraft. However, they stated that we did lose
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some core capability in sustaining engineering and asset management. The consensus
was that the loss of the core capability was small when compared to the projected $177.6
million financial savings over the life of the TSPR contract.

Overall Conclusion
Although our findings are far from conclusive evidence that the Air Force as a
whole is receiving a better value by outsourcing their depot level maintenance functions.
It appears we are saving money on the F-l 17 under the TSPR contract. It is important to
note that these savings are based on the available cost information and were not based on
the governments most efficient organization analysis as required by A-76 regulations.

Recommendations for Further Use of This Information
With the elimination, or at least slow down, of base closures as the primary means
of reducing costs within DoD, outsourcing has become the method of choice for cost
reduction efforts. The results of this analysis, while only a single case study, indicate that
DoD should be cautious about wholeheartedly embracing the Commission on Roles and
Missions (CORM) and Defense Science Boards (DSB) recommendations to outsource
essentially every non-warfighting activity. There is potential for savings; however, there
are many factors to consider. DoD needs to be very careful about making outsourcing
decisions before doing the research (Saleck, 1998). While each outsourcing decision is
unique, there are key similarities. There are costs incurred in competitions between the
public and private sector. There are costs associated with eliminating government
civilian jobs. Many times the personnel savings are not as high as projected since many
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displaced civilian employees bump into lower graded jobs while retaining their current
pay, and often there is difficulty in comparing performance before and after. All of these
problems can be overcome; however, these issues need to be considered before making
the decision to outsource.

Recommendations for Future Research
A follow-on study should be accomplished to examine the decision to outsource
F-117 sustainment efforts after the TSPR contract has been in place for at least two years.
This should allow sufficient time for a fair comparison of performance before and after
the TSPR contract was awarded.
A study should be accomplished that examines the overall benefit or detriment to
the DoD from outsourcing. Once the decision to outsource a function has been made, the
decision is nearly irreversible; infrastructure is eliminated and expertise is lost. Rather
than look at a single circumstance, the overall picture needs to be examined to determine
if, in total, outsourcing is detrimental to our ability to sustain a prolonged contingency.
The difficulty in making an accurate comparison lies in the ability of the
government to accurately track its costs. It is imperative that we determine our true
savings before projecting these savings into future budgets. A joint program team
consisting of contracting, financial, budget, maintenance, and logistics personnel could
focus on all aspects of outsourcing to determine true cost savings and the overall value to
the Air Force. The goal would be to have each member provide input relating to their job
specialty. Once key similarities are identified a model can be built that can be applied to
any outsourcing situation with minimal tailoring for the specific situation.
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Appendix A: Definitions
Key terms and definitions that are necessary to understand the major aspects of
this research proposal include:
Outsourcing - is the use of federal funds to pay a private company to do defense
work or provide a service for a defense activity (GAO Report, GAO/NSAID-97-86,
1997).
Privatization - is the complete transfer of ownership and management of a
function to the private sector, but DOD pays for the services associated with the function
(GAO Report, GAO/NSAID-97-86,1997).
Better Value - is a construct, in this framework, that is measured by whether or
not there are actual improvements in cost, mission capable ratings (MCR's), quality,
timeliness, and reliability of depot repairs. It also considers whether or not the
knowledge, expertise and experience level of the contractor's depot-level technicians aids
in the ability to answer questions and fix problems more rapidly and with greater
accuracy than with the organic technicians. Finally it includes a measure of a perceived
overall improved efficiency of the working relationship between flight line maintenance
teams and the depot.
Modernization - is a key goal of the Air Force leadership, outlined in Joint Vision
2001, to replace or upgrade the aging Air Force weapon systems. This goal, due to
decreasing budgets and manpower resources, is what drives the desire to save money by
closing bases and outsourcing functions that are not inherently governmental.
Inherently Governmental Function - is "a function that is so intimately related to
the public interest as to mandate performance by Government employees? These
functions include those activities that require either the exercise of discretion in applying
Government authority or the making of value judgments in making decisions for the
Government" (GAO Report, GAO/NSAID-97-86,1997).
The foUowing definitions come directly from the F-117 TSPR Performance Metrics
(as of 11 September 98).
Total Non Mission Capable Supply Rate - (TNMCS) is calculated monthly to
establish a 12-month moving average. This metric is based upon the percentage of
aircraft not mission capable due to supply. Non-Mission Capable Supply (NMCS) is
additive to Non-Mission Capable Both (NCMB) to compute the TNMCS.
Scoring: NMCS rates at or below 5.0% will receive a score of 10. From 5.1% to 5.5% =
9, from 5.6% to 6.0% = 8 etc. All fractions will be rounded up to the nearest tenth.
NMCS rates of 9.6% or greater it will receive a score of 0.
Premises:
1. This metric pertains to LMSW-supplied items only an excludes the following:
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NSN items
Local Fabricated Items (SMR code MXX)
Local Assembled Items (SMR code AXX)
Local Purchased Items
Conditions:
1. HAFB will calculate the supply rate (S-Rate) monthly and provide to LMSW
Support Center and SPO by the 15th of each month.
2. LMSW can request relief on specific items due to maintenance-induced
failures of low stockage items (i.e. damaged noses, wages, etc.) The
contracting officer will approve or deny requests for relief.
MICAP Delivery - MICAP response time will be calculated monthly to establish a
twelve month moving average. This metric is based upon the time taken by LMSW to
deliver parts on MICAPs to HAFB. A MICAP our will begin upon LMSW notification,
requirement and will end upon receipt of the item in HAFB supply. Logs will be kept at
LMSW and HAFB recording the time and date of the MICAP and the corresponding
time/date of the part delivery. Scoring: Average response times of 72 hours or less will
receive a score of 10. Average response times greater than 73 hours and up to 84 hours
will receive a score of 9. Average response times between 85 and 96 hours will receive a
score of 8, etc. Average response times greater than 181 will receive a score of 0.
Premises:
1. This metric pertains to LMSW supplied items only, which excludes the
following:
NSN items
Local Fabricated Items (SMR code MXX)
Local Assembled Items (SMR code AXX)
Local Purchased Items
2. 72 hours applies to delivery within the Continental US (CONUS) only.
Conditions:
1. LMSW can request relief on specific items I created disproportionate negative
impact on the right. The contracting officer will approve or deny any request
for relief.
2. LMSW and HAFB logs will be reconciled and reported to LMSW Supply and
SPO by the 15th of each month. HAFB will have the final decision on the
report. Monthly report will be submitted to LMSW Supply and SPO.
RSP Kit Fill Rate - RSP Kit Fill Rates will be calculated monthly to establish a 12
month moving average. This metric is based upon the total number of pieces on hand in
both A and B kits divided by the total number of pieces authorized. This rate is
expressed as a percentage. Scoring: Fill rates at 97% or above will receive a score of 10.
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From 96% to 96.9% = 9,95% to 95.9% = 8 etc. All fractions will be rounded up to the
nearest tenth. Fill rates below 86% will receive a score of 0.
Premises:
1. This metric pertains to LMSW-supplied Recoverable Items (XD) and
excludes the following:
NSN items
Local Fabricated Items (SMR code MXX)
Local Assembled Items (SMR code AXX)
Local Purchased Items
Deployed Kits
2. Kits returning from deployment shall be excluded from the metric
performance measurement for 30 days to allow for stock
replenishment.
Conditions:
1. HAFB will compile and submit a report to LMSW Supply and the
SPO by the 15th of each month.
2. Mission Support Kit (MSK) requirements taken out of RSP still need
to be reported as part of RSP. Deployment of one RSP Kit will not
alter the metric criteria. Performance will continue to be graded
against the remaining kit. Should all RSP Kits be deployed, the weight
assigned to this metric will be assigned to NMCS for the duration of
the deployment. When the kits return, the 12-month moving average
will be reduced by the months the kits were deployed.
3. Should one or both kits deploy for less than a month, the kit will be
considered deployed for the full month.
4. Top score of 97% applies to RSP Kits with Low Observable (LO)
considerable materials. Should LO be removed from the kits, top
score becomes 96%. The contract will not require renegotiation in this
instance.
Depot Quality - is calculated by individual aircraft using a weighted point system
that is based upon the number of major and minor discrepancies found after the
contractor has requested DCMC sign-off for closure. After each inspection,
representatives from LMSW Quality Assurance and DCMC Quality Assurance will
review DCMC write-ups. Those found without merit will be documented but not
considered for scoring. DCMC will have final determination of merit.
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Scoring: Weighted Point System
Major
Discrepancy Count
Points
0-4
10
5-9
15
10-14
25
15-up
50

Minor
Discrepancy Count
0-10
11-20
21-30
31-up

Points
10
15
25
50

The number of major and minor discrepancies, found during DCMC Quality Assurance
Inspections, on each aircraft are converted to points per aircraft. Points per aircraft will
be totaled and divided by the number of aircraft inspected to produce a 12-month moving
average. An average of 20 points results in a score of 10; 21 to 25 is a score of 9, etc.
Totals of 65 points or higher results in 0 points.
Premises:
1. Major Discrepancy - (Red X as specified in TO 00-20-1): the weapon system,
supports system, or equipment is considered unsafe or unfit for flight use.
The weapon system, support system, or equipment will not be flown or used
until the unsatisfactory condition is corrected or symbol cleared.
2. Minor Discrepancy - is an unsatisfactory condition, but the condition is not
sufficiently urgent or dangerous to warrant grounding of the aircraft or
discontinuing use of the equipment.
3. A list of Mandatory Government Inspections (MGIs) will be provided to
LMSW Quality Assurance office. The MGI list may change due to the work
contracted.
Conditions:
1. DCMC will provide a quarterly report to LMSW Quality Assurance and the
SPO by the 15th of the month following the end of the quarter.
Depot Delivery - The depot delivery metric is calculated for each aircraft and is
based upon the total number of days each aircraft fails to deliver on time. Delivery is
tracked by aircraft and reflects the number of days behind schedule an aircraft is actually
delivered. The number of days is totaled after each delivery and then averaged across the
number of aircraft delivered to establish a 12-month moving average.
Scoring: Delivered aircraft will be scored as follows: An average of 0 to 0.9 days behind
schedule receives a score of 10. An average of 1.0 to 1.9 days behind schedule receives a
score of 8, 2.0 to 2.9 days behind schedule receives a score of 6, 3.0 to 3.9 days behind
schedule receive a score of 4, 4.0 to 4.9 days behind schedule receives a score of 2, and
aircraft 5 or more days behind schedule receive a score of 0.
Premises:
1. Total days behind schedule are calculated by adding the number of total days
aircraft were not delivered on the scheduled output date.
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2. "On time delivery" is defined as all depot requirements have been met and
wheels are up and locked on departure from the depot.
Conditions:
1. Aircraft will be delivered in accordance with the negotiated work package.
Changes in delivery will be negotiated between LMSW, DCMC and the SPO.
2. DCMC will provide a quarterly report to LMSW Quality Assurance and the
SPO by the 15th of the month, following the end of the quarter.
Delinquent Efficiency Reports (DRs) - Delinquency tracking is performed
monthly to establish a 12-month moving average. This metric is based on the average
number of delinquent DRs. Scoring: An average of 0 to 1 delinquent DRs for the
reporting period receives a score of 10. 2 delinquent DRs receive a score of 9,3
delinquent DRs receive a score of 8, etc. 11 or more delinquent DRs receive a score of 0.
Premises:
1. DR response time starts upon receipt of exhibit at LMSW or Supplier Facility
(if shipped direct).
2. Time frames for this metric are contained in TSPR 800, dated 1 Oct. 98.
Conditions:
1. LMSW will provide a quarterly report to the SPO by the 15th of the month,
following the end of the quarter.
WST Credited Availability -WST Credited Availability is calculated monthly to
establish a 12-month moving average. Credited availability is computed as follows:
Ca = Tu + Td - Tc + Ta
Ts + Ta
Ca = Credited Availability
Tu = Utilization Time (Actual WST usage for the period)
Td = Total Deviation Time (Events such as the weather, power outages, etc. that
cannot be controlled by the contractor).
Tc = Chargeable Maintenance Deviations (Unscheduled maintenance performed
during schedule training time).
Ta = Alternate Mission Time (Negative if time lost) (Time spent on a mission
other than what was planned for training because of degraded WST
performance).
Ts = Scheduled training time
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WST Availability metrics by fiscal year (FY) shall be as follows:
FY
Metric
•99
99%
•00
99%
•01
*93%
•02
*91%
•03
*89%
•04
*75%
'05
**97%
•06
**99%
Scoring: An average of 99% or greater for the period receives a score of 10. From 98.6
to 98.9 receives a score of 9, etc. An average of 95% or last receives a score of 0. (In
years were the top score differs from 99% (FY' 01-05), metric scoring will begin with the
number shown in the table above and be broken down accordingly.)
Conditions:
1. LMSW will provide a quarterly report to the SPO by the 15 of the month,
following the end of the quarter.
2. * - The AP500, Array Processor, will impact of the WST availability
beginning in FY' 01. An interim solution must be implemented no later than
FY01 or the Array Processor (AP500) will be significantly impacted to the
point where it would become nonfunctional. If this occurs or when the
remaining spares are no longer supportable the WST availability will be
calculated on all functions not dependent on the array processor.
3. ** - Upgrade to the host computer suite will occur in FY' 04. WST
availability will reduce each fiscal year based on supportability of the current
host computer suite. Should upgrade of the host computer suite not occur in
FY 04, WST availability will be reduced to 50% in FY' 05 and 0% in FY' 06.
4. Upgrade to the host computer suite is considered outside the scope of the
TSPR contract.
General Scoring/Performance Calculations:
"Total Value" consists of:
1. Current Performance
2. Score - Calculated based on Current Performance
3. Weight - Normalizes the metric to the weight of its importance
4. Value - Score x Weight
"Total Value" calculations are based as follows:
1. Performance values are translated into Scores based on comparison of Current
Performance to the respective scoring guidelines found in the matrix.
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2. Wants the actual Score is determined, it is entered as the Score at the top of
the chart.
3. That Score is then multiplied by the Weight assigned to the respective metric
and is reflected on the line identified as Value.
4. Each metric has been assigned a metric based on criticality of support to
HAFB.
5. Maximum point value for "Total Value" is 1,000 distributed as follows:
- CLIN 0001 700 Points
- NMCS
- MICAP
- RSP Fill Rate
- Delinquent DRs
- WST Availability
- CLIN 0002 300 Points
- DCMC Depot Quality Assurance
- Depot Delivery
6. Total points awarded will be displayed as a percentage of this Total Points
Available. This percentage will be the Performance Incentive Fee for each
CLIN.
Example:
Delinquent DRs: Current Performance = 0 Delinquent
Score =10
Weight =10
Value toward Total = Score (10) x Weight (10) = Value (100 Points)
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Appendix B: Customer Satisfaction Questionnaire
Demographics

1.) What is your current rank?
2.) What is your current duty title?
3.) How many years experience do you have working on the F -117?
0-1

2-3

4-5

6-7

8-9

9+

4.) What is the highest education level you have completed?
High school

Associates Degree

Bachelor's Degree

Masters Degree

Ph.D.

5.) What is your current career skill level?
3 level

5 level

7 level

Performance Questions
Effective 1 October 1998, a contract was let to transfer total system performance
responsibility for depot level maintenance to a contractor. The following questions
seek to measure your perceptions of the difference in the quality of support you
receive, if any, comparing support for the periods before 1 Oct 98 to support after
!Oct98.
6.) The number of aircraft non mission capable due to supply is
1
Much
Better

Somewhat
Better

3
No
Change

Somewhat
Worse

5
Much
Worse

Somewhat
Increased

5
Greatly
Increased

7.) The time it takes to have MICAP parts delivered has
1
Greatly
Decreased

Marginally
Decreased

3
Has Not
Changed
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8.) Replacement Spare Parts (RSP) Kit fill rates are
1
Much
Better

2
Somewhat
Better

3
No
Change

4
Somewhat
Worse

5
Much
Worse

9.) The number of major and minor discrepancies found after depot repair has
12
Greatly
Somewhat
Decreased
Decreased
10.)

5
Greatly
Increased

3
Has Not
Changed

4
Somewhat
Increased

5
Greatly
Increased

The number of Delinquent Efficiency Reports (DR's) has

1
Greatly
Decreased
12.)

4
Somewhat
Increased

The number of aircraft being delivered behind schedule from the depot has

12
Greatly
Somewhat
Decreased
Decreased
11.)

3
Has Not
Changed

2
Somewhat
Decreased

3
Has Not
Changed

4
Somewhat
Increased

5
Greatly
Increased

The overall maintenance relationship between the depot and the 49th is....

12
Greatly
Somewhat
Improved
Improved

3
Has Not
Changed

4
Somewhat
Worse

5
Much
Worse

13.) Are we measuring the correct performance indicators? Please tell us what
things you believe should be measured to evaluate the contractors performance
in regards to helping you perform your job in the most effective and efficient
manner possible.
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